A third consideration, first noted generically by Machiavelli IIRC, is that one's reform loss is certain (the bird in the hand flies away) while one's offsetting reform gain is hypothetical and uncertain (are there really two birds in that bush?).
Thus the playing field is always tilted -- perhaps usefully so -- against reforms of all kinds. However the deck seems over-stacked against change in the contemporary US, where interest-group advocacy has achieved unprecedented efficiencies while the general-interest information channels of democratic governance are failing.
A third consideration, first noted generically by Machiavelli IIRC, is that one's reform loss is certain (the bird in the hand flies away) while one's offsetting reform gain is hypothetical and uncertain (are there really two birds in that bush?).
Thus the playing field is always tilted -- perhaps usefully so -- against reforms of all kinds. However the deck seems over-stacked against change in the contemporary US, where interest-group advocacy has achieved unprecedented efficiencies while the general-interest information channels of democratic governance are failing.
My error ... my comment above is directed to the article above.